We show that exposure from past business transactions -risk overhang -can reduce activity in related business lines, sometimes to the point where no new trade occurs. We focus primarily on the role of overhang in nonlife insurance market disruptions. Our model predicts that the relative impact, duration, and character of supply disruptions are related to the extent of overhang. These predictions are consistent with differences between the mid-1980s liability insurance crisis and the early-1990s catastrophe reinsurance crisis. The overhang model predicts attributes of these crises that prior explanations relying on adverse selection do not. We also discuss applications of the overhang model to disruptions in lending and securities markets.
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Limited capacity has been used more generally to explain the overall pattern called the insurance cycle, of which crises are a part. A typical cycle starts with a crisis, which is followed by a few years of relatively high prices, restricted but no longer declining availability and high profitability. This evolves into a market where prices and profitability are eroding and insurance is relatively abundant. After several years of these declining market conditions for insurers, another crisis repeats the cycle. See Stewart (1984) , Winter (1988 Winter ( , 1991 and Gron (1994) . 2 Liability insurance covers losses from third party claims against the policyholder; the 1980's liability crisis was particularly severe in commercial liability lines such as product liability, professional liability and environmental liability. Reinsurance refers to insurance purchased by insurers as opposed to other firms or households. Catastrophe reinsurance covers significant property losses associated with natural catastrophe events such as a hurricane, windstorm or earthquake. 1
Introduction
In this paper we show that an overhang of risk from continuing exposure to past transactions can affect current business decisions, reducing activity. Our work builds on that of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) , who show that capital market imperfections can cause otherwise risk-neutral firms to behave in a risk-averse fashion, and that negative shocks to internal capital make firms more risk averse. Given these results, consider the firm's business lines as a portfolio. All else equal, an effectively risk-averse firm will try to smooth exposures across different areas. When risk acquired through past transactions is costly to diversify or hedge, overhang from past transactions increases existing exposure and reduces the additional amount of exposure the firm is willing to take on in related business lines. This translates into a reluctance to supply more products or services in that line. The impact of the overhang is greater as either the magnitude of old exposures or the correlation between old and new business exposures is greater. Under some conditions, the effect can be so great that no new transactions occur.
Our primary focus is the market for nonlife insurance, where severe disruptions of trade ("crises") are recurring events. A crisis typically begins with a sudden increase in insured losses; during the crisis, insurance prices increase sharply while quantities decline, with some types of coverage being completely unavailable. The most common explanation is that industry-wide losses diminish insurers' existing capital base, and capital market imperfections make it costly to raise more capital quickly; the resulting shortage of capital sharply diminishes insurers' capacity to take on more risk by writing more policies. A limited number of skilled underwriters delays new entry. Nevertheless, capital market imperfections alone do not explain the differential impact of crises across different lines of insurance. Consider the two most recent crises: the mid-1980's crisis in liability insurance, and the early 1990's crisis in catastrophe reinsurance. Problems in the liability insurance market persisted for years, while the catastrophe reinsurance market returned to normal relatively quickly. 2 Our model provides a simple explanation of this difference. It is well-known that the length of time 3 See, for example Priest (1987) and U.S. Department of Justice (1986).
2 ("tail") that it takes for claims to be entered against an old insurance policy varies with the line of insurance.
Claims against liability insurance often take many years to be realized, whereas claims against property insurance (which covers damage to the policyholder's property) typically come in soon after the damage is sustained. Furthermore, as we discuss in Section 2b below, there is good reason to expect positive correlation between currently-realized claims against old policies and claims against new policies. This provides a natural application of our model: liability insurers face a great deal of overhang from old policies whereas catastrophe reinsurers face relatively little. Thus, during the liability insurance crisis, a large overhang from old policies reduced liability insurers' ability to take on more liability risk for a significant length of time.
By contrast, during the catastrophe reinsurance crisis, the overhang from old policies diminished more quickly, so catastrophe reinsurers' ability to supply catastrophe reinsurance recovered more quickly as well.
A second feature of crises is insurers' refusal to sell specific lines of insurance. For example, during the liability crisis many insurers withdrew from lines of insurance such as day care liability, municipal liability, environmental liability, and directors' and officers' liability.
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Existing explanations focus on asymmetric information and adverse selection between insurers and insurance buyers (see, for example, Priest (1987) and Section 3 below). Although adverse selection is undoubtedly an important factor in insurance markets, this particular adverse selection explanation does not explain why many but not all insurers withdraw from specific lines of insurance, or why insurers cancel existing policies during a crisis.
In contrast, our overhang model suggests that cancellations may occur as a means of reducing exposure in a given sector. As described in Section 4, our model does rely on asymmetric information or some other friction to make risk overhang difficult to hedge or diversify, but the critical information asymmetries in this case are those between existing insurers and reinsurers or new entrants into the market.
Our model also has applications beyond nonlife insurance. For example, "credit crunches" -"excessive" reluctance to lend by banks and other lenders during sector downturns -are consistent with risk overhang from existing loans, whose increased risk and illiquidity make this exposure difficult to unload.
Consistent with actual behavior, our model suggests that a credit crunch will be most severe in the sector hit by the downturn, that lending in that sector may effectively cease, and that lenders may even be driven to call loans. Similarly, because securities such as junk bonds and mortgage-backed securities can become quite illiquid after a market downturn, securities firms active in these sectors can suffer from risk overhang: their risky unsellable inventories will constrain their underwriting and dealing activity in that area, deepening and extending the crisis. Finally, to the extent nonfinancial firms face noninsured exposures from past business transactions in a given line of business, their interest in additional transactions in this line will be reduced -even if this additional business seems profitable by itself.
Although others have examined the implications of capital market imperfections for financial institutions' portfolio choices, our work differs by focusing on the effects of risk overhang from past business transactions on institutions' decisions and market conditions. Froot and Stein (1998) examine capital budgeting rules for institutions in a setting where some positions can be hedged and others cannot; their focus is on pricing rules and hedging decisions for an institution, taking market conditions as given. Froot and O'Connell (1996) examine insurance market equilibrium in a setting where both insurers and insurance buyers are effectively risk averse, but do not allow for exposures coming from past decisions. As we show, allowing for risk overhang from past business can have a dramatic effect on equilibrium price and quantity, in some cases leading to total cessation of the market. Our paper's structure is as follows. Section 2 begins by analyzing a simple portfolio model of risksharing between firms and insurers analogous to that of Froot and O'Connell (1996) and showing that it is consistent with typical insurance cycle behavior. We then extend these results to the case where the insurer faces risk overhang from policies sold in earlier periods. We show that overhang reduces and can in some cases completely eliminate activity in the affected lines of insurance. Section 3 applies our model to the previously-mentioned liability insurance and catastrophe reinsurance crises. Section 4 contrasts our model with the standard explanation of insurance market failures during crises based on increased information asymmetries and adverse selection, and then discusses how the overhang model implicitly relies on either different information asymmetries or other market frictions. Section 5 applies our results to other financial intermediaries, while Section 6 summarizes our findings and concludes.
Insurance Market Equilibrium
Our framework builds on the work of Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) (henceforth "FSS") in motivating risk-averse behavior by firms. In that model, firms have valuable future investments that require financing, and capital market imperfections make it costly to acquire external funding; greater risk of internal cash flows results in greater expected funding costs, making otherwise risk-neutral firms behave in a riskaverse fashion. Our particular implementation follows that of Froot and O'Connell (1996) in applying this model to equilibrium in the insurance market; the critical distinction of our model from that of Froot and O'Connell is that they do not allow for an overhang of exposures from old policies. After modeling equilibrium in the absence of overhang, we allow for overhang and examine its impact.
2a Market Equilibrium without Overhang
We begin with two representative firms, a and b, which have investment projects that they wish to fund at the end of period 1. Projects can be funded out of internal funds, w, or external funds, e, where external funds are assumed to be more costly than internal funds. As shown by FSS, this asymmetry between 4 Stein's Lemma states that if x and y are normally distributed, cov(a(x),y) = E[ak(x)]·cov(x, y). See Stein (1981) . 4 w i1 w i0 ( 1 q i )η i ( 1 p i ) µ i q i .
(1)
internal and external funds means that each firm's objective function is increasing and generally concave in its stock of internal funds. Intuitively, more internal funds lessen the extent to which a firm must rely on costly external funds, but this benefit is generally decreasing because, at the margin, there are fewer profitable uses for these funds. Denoting the indirect form of firm i's objective function as P i (w), we have P i w > 0 and P i ww < 0. Each firm begins period 1 with w i0 in internal funds. If it purchases no insurance, firm i will have internal funds w i1 = w i0 > η i , at the end of the period where η i is an insurable shock to that firm. For simplicity, shocks are normally distributed, with mean µ i , variance σ ii , and covariance σ ab between shocks to a and b. Each firm may also purchase a proportional insurance contract. Let q i denote firm i's fractional coverage of its shock in period 1. The total cost ("premium") of insurance against shock i is (1+p i )µ i times q i ; thus, a premium with "price" p i equal to zero would be actuarially fair. With these definitions, it follows that, if the firm i purchases coverage q i , its internal funds at the end of period 1 will be Turning to the other side of the market, the representative insurance company, I, faces a similar problem. The insurer must maintain reserves and surplus so as to make good on its policies with a high degree of certainty, but this means that if it suffers losses, it may have to resort to costly external finance to 5 We assume that insurers and buyers operate in competitive markets. Other assumptions about the form of competition such as Cournot yield similar outcomes (see Froot and O'Connell, 1996) .
w I1 w I0 ( 1 p a ) µ a q a q aηa ( 1 p b ) µ b q b q bηb .
(4)
replenish its reserves. If the insurer begins the period with w I0 in net worth, then its end-of-period funds are
In analogous fashion to firms, costs of external finance will give the insurer an indirect utility of internal funds function, which we denote as P I (w I1 ); once more, P I w > 0 and P I ww < 0. The insurer chooses the coverage it offers to firms a and b so as to maximize P I (w I1 ), taking insurance prices as given. Note that the firm insures a fraction of the shock equal to its share of total risk aversion, so an increase in its risk aversion relative to the insurer's leads to an increase in the fraction insured. (Alternatively, the insurer provides insurance coverage equal to its share of total risk tolerance, which is the inverse of risk aversion.) Also, an increase in either the firm's or the insurer's risk aversion increases the price of insurance.
Ignoring indirect effects on firm or insurer risk aversion, an increase in the variance of the shock tends to increase the price of insurance, whereas an increase in its mean tends to decrease price. These changes will also affect risk aversion. For example, FSS argue that the indirect utility function over internal funds exhibits decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA); intuitively, the higher the firm's initial internal funds, the less 6 Note that all these events will result in a significant decline of net worth across the industry or at least across a large segment of the industry, thus producing the industry-wide effects. A large catastrophe will reduce net worth in the primary insurance market and at the same time reduce net worth in the reinsurance market which typically supplies needed liquidity for the primary insurance market. Higher than expected cost inflation will have a significant effect if it is a large difference or if it occurs in a line of business composing a significant share of insurers' costs, such as automobile insurance. Finally, unexpected changes in tort law will tend to affect the expected claims associated with all liability contracts, both past and present which can constitute a significant amount of the net worth of insurers selling liability contracts. See, for example, Winter (1991) or Harrington and Neihaus (1998) . 8 Froot and O'Connell make this point in the context of reinsurers. 6 likely it is that the firm will require costly external finance even for poor outcomes, reducing its effective aversion to risk. Using (1), an increase of ∆µ i in the mean of the shock is equivalent to a decrease of (1+p i q i )∆µ i in the firm's initial internal funds level; under DARA, this increases the firm's effective risk aversion G i . Similarly, since the insurer's expected wealth increases by p i q i ∆µ i , the insurer's risk aversion
This model is consistent with the previous description of insurance cycles. Here, insurance cycles are caused by temporary industry capacity shortages resulting from sudden declines in insurers' net worth caused by unexpected changes in insurer costs, such as large catastrophes, higher-than-expected cost inflation, or unforeseen changes in tort law. 6 The declines in insurer net worth increase insurers' effective risk aversion; Lemma 1 shows that, as long as buyers' risk aversion is relatively unchanged, the price of insurance will increase and the quantity will decrease. Indeed, temporary capacity shortages are a leading explanation of insurance cycles.
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Of course, in order for declines in net worth to produce significant market effects, there must be a delay in new entry or expansion by existing firms. There are several potential sources for this delay, including limited supply of knowledgeable underwriters and other personnel needed by new entrants, information advantages for insurers currently writing specific lines, and asymmetric information between existing firms and capital markets. We discuss barriers to entry in greater detail in Section 4.
This model is also consistent with the apparent randomness of market disruptions. Suppose that, during "normal" times, insurer capital is relatively abundant compared to that of insured firms (the notion being that diversified intermediaries such as insurers have lower costs of accessing equity markets than do many small and middle market nonfinancial firms). Thus G I will be close to zero, q i e will be close to one, and p i e will be close to zero.
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In this case, unless a negative shock to insurers is very large, it is unlikely to have much effect on insurer risk aversion and equilibrium prices and quantities. By contrast, if insurers do suffer a very large shock, or a moderately large shock comes at a time when a series of losses have already depleted insurer capital, it will have a relatively greater effect on insurer risk aversion and equilibrium price and quantity. 9 In section 4 we discuss asymmetric information as a possible source of this friction. 
Although this model is consistent with the general notion of insurance cycles, it does not provide much insight into the duration of disruptions across different lines, nor does it explain why some insurance markets break down, with no insurance being available at any price. Risk overhang from old policies has the ability to provide these insights. We now extend the model to include such an overhang of risk.
2b Market Equilibrium with Risk Overhang from Old Policies
Until this point, we have implicitly assumed that all claims arising from any "date 0" policies have settled by the beginning of the current period; thus, while they might affect the initial funds level of each firm (and thus their insurer as well), no more uncertainty remains. In practice, this is not always the case; some lines of insurance are particularly "long-tailed," meaning that it takes years for most claims arising from the coverage period to emerge and be settled. In what follows we assume that the shocks affecting firms a and b are uncorrelated in order to focus on the correlation between a given firm's current and previous shocks. We also assume that period 0 risks are not easily insured or hedged in period 1.
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A number of systematic factors make it likely that currently-realized claims against old policies and claims against new policies will be positively correlated. For example, an unexpected increase in inflation increases the cost of settling claims, whether the claims stem from old or new policies. Another example of a systematic risk is the legal environment, with respect to both the interpretation of policy terms and rules on negligence. Also, if a given firm's products are later found to have unexpectedly high risks to consumers or the environment, this will affect claims on both old and new policies in the same direction.
With these assumptions, firm a's end of period 1 internal funds will now be Note that the firm does not have to pay an additional insurance premium for its date 0 coverage, since this was paid previously and is reflected in the initial funds level w a0 . Deriving the first order condition and rearranging terms, it is easy to show that firm a's demand for date 1 coverage q a is now 
The overhang from previous periods shocks tends to increase the firm's desire for coverage to the extent that (a) the firm didn't already have full coverage of previous shocks (q a 0 < 1), and (b) previous shocks are positively correlated with current shocks (σ int > 0). Once more, the overhang may also have indirect effects;
an unexpected increase in mean losses stemming from previous periods' exposures may increase the firm's risk aversion G a , further increasing the firm's desire for insurance.
Turning to the insurer, its reserves and surplus at the end of period 1 is now and it follows that its supply of insurance coverage to firm a is now Thus, claims from previous periods reduce the insurer's willingness to supply more insurance to firm a. Also, to the extent that this overhang of claims reduces the expected level of the insurer's wealth, G I will increase, further diminishing supply.
Proposition 1. Suppose that a's exposure from previous periods generates η a 0 in current losses, and q a 0 of this is covered by insurance. Then the equilibrium price and quantity of insurance against new shocks to a are while the equilibrium price and quantity of insurance against new shocks to b are Firm a pays a higher price as the covariance between old and new shocks increases, and as either its risk aversion or the insurer's risk aversion increases. If the covariance between old and new shocks is positive, the equilibrium quantity of insurance decreases in the amount of old coverage, and increases in firm a's risk aversion. By contrast, firm b's price and quantity of insurance have the same form as equation (7): firm b's demand for insurance is unaffected by a's overhang, while the insurer's supply of insurance to firm It is easy to show that, if the shocks to a and b were positively correlated, the existence of overhang from a's old policies would decrease the insurer's supply of insurance to b.
b is only affected through possible changes in the insurer's risk aversion, G I .
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By the same token, if the correlation between old and new shocks is zero, overhang has no direct effect on the demand and supply of insurance to firm a, and the equilibrium price and quantity are given by (7); however, the overhang would have an indirect effect by increasing the effective risk aversion of both insurer and firm a.
Suppose that the overhang of a's old exposures has suddenly increased: for example, legal interpretations or knowledge of medical side effects suddenly change so as to increase a's liability. For simplicity, assume that firm a's overhang was zero before the increase, so that firm a's equilibrium price and quantity of insurance were given by (7). After the increase, the equilibrium price and quantity are given by (12). Also, as previously discussed, the increase in overhang will tend to increase the risk aversion of both Since risk aversions increase and the covariance σ int of old and new shocks is positive, it is easy to see that price increases. Similarly, the increase in overhang changes the equilibrium quantity by
Here, the direction of the effect is less immediate: although the direct impact of the overhang is negative, the overall effect need not be. The following result outlines when the overall effect is certainly negative.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium quantity of coverage decreases as a result of overhang when the increase in overhang has a smaller relative effect on firm a's risk aversion than on the insurer's risk aversion, and the quantity of old coverage outstanding, q a 0 , exceeds the amount that the firm would buy in a single period absent overhang (i.e., the quantity given by (7)).
Absent overhang, firm a's coverage is just the ratio of its risk aversion to the sum of the risk aversions of itself and the insurer; thus a smaller relative increase in its risk aversion guarantees that this 11 The key feature for adverse selection is differential information of buyers and sellers. Although some might argue that short-tailed lines have more observables, that does not imply less differential information. Indeed, one might argue that an insurer dealing with many buyers might be better informed about tort law uncertainty than any one buyer. Several empirical papers find evidence of adverse selection in automobile insurance markets: Dahlby (1983), D'Arcy and Doherty (1990), Dionne and Doherty (1994) . D'Arcy and Doherty find evidence of significant adverse selection for new insurance companies so that it is costly to develop new business or enter new markets. 10 amount will fall. The condition on q a 0 guarantees that the terms in (15) multiplying σ int /σ aa are also negative in total, and so the result follows.
How reasonable are these restrictions? The increase in overhang can reflect claims arising from many years of previous coverage; thus, even if firm a is growing, assuming that q a 0 exceeds the amount of coverage that firm a would generally buy in a year is not outlandish. Moreover, as discussed in the previous section, if in normal times the firm's effective risk aversion greatly exceeds the insurer's, then the firm's typical preoverhang purchase of coverage will be close to one. In such a circumstance, an increase in overhang will have a greater expected wealth impact on the insurer than on the firm, and the insurer's risk aversion may well increase relatively more than firm a's.
Indeed, if q a 0 is sufficiently great and the correlation between exposures from the past and the present is high enough, the equilibrium amount of coverage given by (12) is negative. In this case, the insurer's preexisting exposure from old policies effectively closes down the market. The insurer would actually like to reduce its overhang if at all possible. For example, we may observe cancellations of policies currently in force -that is, the insurer may cancel policies for the remainder of their policy term and refund a proportional amount of the premiums. Now consider the case where shocks to firm a and b are strongly correlated, as might be the case for liability insurance, where much of the risk has to do with legal changes that apply across all firms. It is easy to show that, from the insurer's point of view, insurance for a and for b are substitutes, and perfect substitutes if the risks are perfectly correlated. If firm a's overhang is sufficiently great, neither firm a nor firm b will buy insurance -even if there is no existing overhang on policies to firm b. Thus, with overhang, new buyers may find themselves out of the market, in the sense that they choose not to get insurance at current prices.
Application to Insurance Markets
The overhang model has several testable predictions, one of which is that a market disruption in long-tailed lines will last longer than a similar increase in the risk of short-tailed lines. In principle, adverse selection should not generate this result: uncertainty over policyholder type can be just as great for shorttailed lines (such as fire or automobile physical damage) as for long-tailed lines (such as product liability).
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Unfortunately, the relative infrequency of insurance crises combined with a lack of precise data precludes
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The report documents effects in a number of specific lines, including environmental impairment liability, sudden and accidental pollution coverage, directors and officers liability, bank fidelity bond coverage, motor carrier liability, liquor liability, medical malpractice insurance, commercial general liability (including product liability), and excess coverage.
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For example, St. Paul's Insurance company stopped writing new medical malpractice insurance policies. Liability policy cancellations were reported for cities, nurse-midwives, day care centers, automobile repair shops, manufacturing companies (U.S. Department of Justice, 1986).
14 There was also disruption in the "primary" market (that for homeowners and businesses located in areas subject to catastrophe losses). In Florida and other coastal areas there were cases of policy cancellations and refusals to renew. However, in contrast to the liability crisis, other insurers with less exposure in the area were often willing to come in and write policies (Dow Jones News Wire, 1993, and Kerr, 1993) . 15 Catastrophe reinsurance contracts are characterized by a deductible (also known as the point of attachment), a policy limit, and a copayment rate. The copayment rate is the proportion of losses above the deductible and below the policy limit that the buying insurer must pay itself. 11 formal testing of these predictions, but we can demonstrate that the characteristics of the most recent crises do fit the pattern predicted by risk overhang from old policies.
The two most recent significant insurance market disruptions occurred in 1984 in the commercial liability market, and in 1992 in the catastrophe reinsurance market. A 1986 report characterized the conditions of the liability crisis this way: "...a dramatic change in the last two years in the availability, affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Where insurance is available (and in some areas it simply is not), premium increases of several hundred percent over the last year or two have become commonplace. Few if any private or public entities that rely on liability insurance have escaped the problems generated by this crisis." (U.S. Department of Justice, 1986, p.1.) 12 In addition to these problems, some insurers also stopped writing new policies, and canceled existing policies.
13 Winter (1991) calculates that real premiums increased by a factor of 3 over the 1984-1986 period, and that by the middle of 1987 the market began to turn again.
The catastrophe reinsurance of the early 1990s was also marked by sudden, substantial increases in premiums with accompanying increases in deductibles and decreases in policy limits. The crisis began in August 1992 following Hurricane Andrew, which caused over $16 billion in insured losses. As with the liability crisis, buyers of catastrophe reinsurance faced stiff price increases, increased deductibles, and lower limits.
14 For example, Nationwide Insurance's catastrophe reinsurance deductible went from $30 million before Andrew to $100 million after; also, Nationwide was now responsible for a higher proportion of the loss, even though its policy premium was almost the same (Satterfield, 1993) .
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A year later, prices were still 16 Full documentation of the increase in price and decrease in quantity are complicated by the fact that both price and quantity are denominated in dollars. Industry statistics report premium revenues, a combination of price and quantity. Following premium changes for a particular firm is also misleading since surveys indicate that deductibles are increasing and policy limits are declining simultaneously with large price increases (see, for example, Weber, 1987 , or US Department of Justice, 1986 .
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Other liability includes all commercial liability other than commercial multiple peril, workers compensation, commercial automobile and medical malpractice 18 Special property includes fire, allied lines (windstorm, riot, explosion, fire sprinkler leakage, and other perils), inland marine, earthquake, glass, burglary and theft. No data on the timing of settlements relative to policy period are generally available for catastrophe coverages or, more specifically, for catastrophe reinsurance. Prior to 1989 insurers were not asked to provide information on the timing of payments for special property lines. Reinsurers are not subject to U.S. insurance regulation and so do not report figures; also, most reinsurers providing catastrophe reinsurance are located overseas. rising; insurers with "earthquake and coastal storm" exposure were likely to see premium increases of 100% or more (McLeod, 1993) . Non-catastrophe property reinsurance was largely unaffected. By mid 1993, observers were predicting the end of the high prices and restricted availability within several months, and various sources report softening of catastrophe reinsurance prices from January 1994 on (McLeod, 1993, Froot and O'Connell, 1997) .
Our thesis is that the overhang model predicts the relative severity and duration of these two events.
We argue that the relative differences in duration (roughly three years for the liability crisis as opposed to one-and-a-half years for the catastrophe reinsurance crisis) and features such as policy cancellations are consistent with the overhang model. To support our contention, we provide data on the relative magnitude of overhang in the two types of coverage and data on the duration and incidence of the two crises.
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As shown in table 1, other liability is a relatively long-tailed line, with less than 20% of eventual claims paid two years after the policy period and with only 64-74% of claims paid after six years.
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Furthermore, the length of the tail appears to have increased in the mid 1980s: the percent of total losses realized within six years fell from 72% on policies written in 1985 to 67% on policies written in 1986 and then to 64% on policies written in 1987. This long tail comes from several features. First, there may be delays in identifying the event which triggers coverage; for example, a product "defect" may take years to become evident. Second, there are likely to be significant delays from legal proceedings. In contrast, catastrophe losses, approximated here by "special property" lines, 18 are quite short-tailed with almost 90% of losses paid during the two years after the policy period. Table 2 provides some overview of the crises associated with each of these lines. Years in which sudden price increases or significant losses occurred are marked by an asterisk: late 1984 for liability lines and 1992 for catastrophe reinsurance. The first set of data in table 2 relates to commercial liability. Prior to 1984, revenue growth was flat or declining, whereas liability insurance premiums increased 49%, 78% and 19 Table A1 reports the only data similar to our liability data relevant to catastrophe reinsurance. It shows premium growth and profit for earthquake and allied lines insurance sold in the primary market, that is, sold by insurers to owners of property. These lines are not very reliable indicators of conditions in the reinsurance market because of regulatory pressure on insurers not to make drastic changes in premiums or coverages. Both lines do, however, exhibit significant price increases following the loss events: the 1992 hurricane for allied lines and the 1994 earthquake.
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21% in the three years after the crisis began. Although premiums are a measure of total industry sales, premium growth serves as a good proxy for price increases associated with the market disruption both because demand for liability insurance is somewhat inelastic to price and because the market disruption was associated with lower policy limits and higher deductibles, indicating a decline in quantity. This suggests roughly three years of increasing prices following the beginning of the market disruption in liability insurance.
The next segment of table 2 provides price and quantity data for a particular type of commercial liability insurance, directors and officers' (D&O) liability coverage. In this particular line, high prices and reduced quantity persisted for more than three years. Although the average premium reached a peak in 1988, the coverage index continued to decline until 1991, indicating continued quantity restrictions through the end of the decade (see Norton and Bastian, 1996) .
The last columns of table 2 present price information for catastrophe reinsurance before and after the market crisis beginning in 1992. Premium growth and profit measures are not available for catastrophe reinsurance because, as mentioned earlier, reinsurance is a global business and reinsurers do not report their revenue figures to US regulators or any single body. We do, however, report a price index which shows a 20% and 60% annual increase in the catastrophe reinsurance price index following Hurricane Andrew in August 1992. By mid 1993 it appears that industry price increases were back to their historical levels and remained there, despite the 1994 Northridge Earthquake which was also a significant loss event.
19 Other data sources provide similar conclusions (see Froot and O'Connell, 1997) . Thus, the duration of the crisis was significantly shorter than that of the liability crisis.
Relation to Adverse Selection
The prevailing explanation for the virtual disappearance of some lines of liability insurance during the liability crisis is adverse selection (see Priest, 1987, and Winter, 1991) . The idea is that large insurer losses accompanied by an increase in the overall risk of losses lead to increased adverse selection: good firms find it even more costly to be insured, so they are more likely to self-insure, increasing the proportion of bad firms in the insurance pool and eventually causing the pool to collapse. Priest (1987) argues that this problem is particularly severe in liability insurance markets. For example, in the product liability market, rising liability insurance prices increase product prices. Higher product prices cause consumers who value the liability coverage less (those who are less likely to have liability claims) to forego purchases, making consumer pools deteriorate as well. This increases adverse selection: manufacturers know more than insurers about their potential product liability because they not only have better information about their products but better information about their consumers as well. Increased risk along with asymmetric information between insurers and manufacturers and between manufacturers and consumers causes the market failure.
Although this theory does predict some features of the liability crisis, it has difficulty explaining others. Policy cancellations are a case in point: one would not expect adverse selection to affect policies purchased before the onset of the crisis, since the policy premium would reflect pre-crisis risk levels -yet such cancellations were widespread. In our model of overhang policy cancellations correspond to the case where the overhang (q a 0 ) is so high that insurers actually wish to have a negative volume of new policies; the only way to achieve this in any degree is to cancel policies currently in force.
The risk overhang theory also provides clear predictions on the relative durations of crises, which this adverse selection theory does not. Indeed, so long as the pool of potential policyholders is unchanged, a market failure caused by adverse selection might be expected to continue indefinitely, or until insurers somehow become better at screening good risks from bad. By contrast, our overhang model suggests that the duration of a crisis is directly related to pre-crisis policy volumes and tail length in that line of insurance.
Although our model does not rely on adverse selection between existing insurers and insurance customers, incorporating slightly different dimensions of asymmetric information has the potential to strengthen our results. One potential objection to the overhang model is that insurers could always sell off their policies through the reinsurance market, removing the overhang. Such reinsurance would not overcome the loss of capital caused by expected losses on the old policies, but it would remove the problem caused by correlation between unexpected losses on old and new policies. The problem is that the insurers have better information about their potential risks and portfolio composition than the reinsurers, leading to adverse selection in the reinsurance market.
Such asymmetric information between incumbent insurers and outsiders also motivates barriers to capital and to entry, which are crucial to the overall theory of insurance cycles. Outside investors will be most reluctant to contribute more capital in settings where adverse selection in insurer quality is severe (see Myers and Majluf, 1984) . Similarly, outside insurers will be most reluctant to enter in settings where incumbents have a high information advantage, since they know that their pool of potential policyholders will be weighted towards the incumbents' rejects. D'Arcy and Doherty (1990) find evidence of this type of asymmetric information in the personal automobile insurance market where "public" information on buyers, such as drivers' records from state departments' of motor vehicles, might be considered more prevalent.
Finally, we should note that adverse selection can also be a concern on the part of potential policyholders; after all, policyholders want an insurer that is likely to be around to meet its obligations when claims come due. Our discussion of overhang has presumed that the insurer fears financial distress, leading to an effectively risk-averse (concave) objective function for the insurer. This makes sense for insurers that still have enough "going-concern" value to make financial distress costly to shareholders and managers alike.
On the other hand, it is well known that once a firm's net worth is sufficiently low, both shareholders and managers may have incentive to gamble on risky, negative expected value projects: shareholders because the upside goes to them while the downside is shared with creditors, managers because it is the only way to have a chance of avoiding bankruptcy and job loss. 20 Alternatively, this can be viewed as an example of the Myers (1977) underinvestment problem, where an overhang of liabilities (in the present case, insurance policies)
causes the firm to eschew decisions that enhance safety.
Now consider an insurance market where a negative shock has occurred and overhang is a concern.
Those insurers with the worst capital positions (including the impact of expected losses from their overhang of old policies) will be the ones most inclined to offer additional policies in this line -in effect, they can "double up" on their existing policies, reaping the benefit of high premiums if no more losses occur, and defaulting otherwise. By contrast, insurers whose positions are relatively better will be concerned about preserving going-concern value and avoiding distress, and thus will be most reluctant to issue additional policies. To the extent insurers have better information about their financial positions (including potential losses from overhang), potential policyholders will be concerned that the insurers most actively seeking new business are "lemons" that cannot make good on their obligations. Thus, demand for insurance policies will be dampened. Once again, overhang contributes to market disruption.
Applications to Other Financial Intermediaries
In our model, insurers are financial intermediaries who offer contracts to customers, exposing the insurers to risk; thus, portfolio considerations are a critical variable in determining the supply of insurance, and an overhang of existing policies can exacerbate the market disruption that follows a large insured shock.
As we now discuss, the same intuition applies to other financial intermediaries as well.
A. Lending Institutions
Banks and other institutions that lend to firms with limited access to public capital markets may face risk overhang problems because default rates exhibit high correlation within a given sector or geographic region. In the event of a sector downturn, expected loan losses increase, depleting lenders' net worth and increasing their effective risk aversion; even without overhang, this should cause a relative reluctance to lend or "credit crunch." The overhang of risky loans also means that lenders will be most averse to make loans in those sectors where they already have large exposures. 21 See for example McDonald (1987, 1992) , Stein (1998), and Winton (1997) . 22 See Dell'Arricia, Friedman, and Marquez (1997) , Shaffer (1998 ),and Winton (1999 . 23 See "Studies on the Causes and Consequences of the 1989 -1992 Credit Slowdown" (1994 .
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Since lending is an information-intensive business, the asymmetric information factors we discussed for insurance will play a role here as well. Heightened asymmetric information between established lenders and other institutions will make it especially costly for incumbent lenders to reduce exposures or raise additional capital. 21 Indeed, if overhang is very severe, established lenders may be forced to call or refuse to renew loans as a way of reducing exposure (though the distress this causes for borrowers will make this a costly risk-reduction method). Similarly, lack of expertise and "winners' curse" concerns will inhibit entry by lenders that don't already have significant presence in the distressed sectors. 22 Both problems will persist as long as the overhang of bad loans is significant.
The upshot is that risk overhang from old loans may exacerbate credit crunches in a sector-specific way. Moreover, since the model requires only that overhang be difficult to unload or hedge and that external finance be costly, even unregulated lenders will be affected. This is certainly consistent with the 1989-1992
credit crunch: problems were most severe in the commercial real estate and business lending sectors, and affected nonbank lenders such as life insurers and finance companies.
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B. Securities Firms
At first glance, securities firms would seem unlikely to suffer from the overhang problem discussed in this paper: since these institutions underwrite and deal in financial securities that are traded in public capital markets, faced with a capital shock, they should be able to sell off any securities that they hold, removing any further exposure to the risk of these securities. Nevertheless, recent events suggest that this is not always the case: the securities these firms deal in may face potentially great informational concerns, exposing them to an illiquid inventory of securities in the event of a market crisis. If so, the overhang of risk emanating from these inventories will make securities firms especially averse to further exposure in that market sector.
Thus, the critical ingredients are that the securities have potentially high risk and information sensitivity, and that the securities' risk be highly correlated within a given sector of the market. Examples of such securities include bonds issued by low credit quality borrowers, where information about borrower quality can lead to great swings in the market value of the bonds, and complex mortgage-backed securities,
where information about precise prepayment rates can have a radical effect on the securities' value and sensitivity to interest rate changes. Note that, in both cases, the risk has a high systematic component: as mentioned previously, credit or default risk is correlated across firms in a given sector or economy, and interest rate changes also have a large systematic component.
A large negative shock in one of these market sectors increases the risk of these securities and thus the relative magnitude of any lemons concerns, making the securities less liquid. 24 Thus, inventories that securities firms have been holding as part of their underwriting and market-making activities are suddenly both riskier and more difficult to unload, leading to a large overhang of risk. Thus, incumbent securities firms will be reluctant to do more underwriting or market-making in this sector. To the extent that pricing and trading these risky securities tends to require more specialized expertise, entry by unaffected securities firms will be difficult. Once again, the market disruption may persist for some time.
These patterns can be seen in the crisis in the U.S. "junk bond" (below investment grade bond) market in [1989] [1990] , the crisis in mortgage-backed securities markets in 1994, and the emerging markets bond crises of 1997 and 1998. 25 Disruptions lasted several years in most cases; for example, junk bond underwriting volumes took until 1992 to recover.
Conclusions
In this paper we extend the portfolio model of corporate risk management introduced in FSS to include an overhang of risk emanating from past business decisions. We show that when those past risks cannot be easily diversified or hedged, they will reduce the firm's willingness to engage in correlated business activities. Our discussion focuses on the nonlife insurance industry, where our model predicts that market disruptions will last longer in lines with greater overhang. Our model also predicts that sufficiently large risk overhang accompanied by a high correlation with future business opportunities can result in sellers withdrawing from the market and trying to shed past exposure. We find supportive evidence for both these predictions by comparing market outcomes during the liability crisis and the catastrophe reinsurance crisis.
The crisis in liability lines, with significantly longer times between events and claims (and thus overhang), persisted longer than that in the catastrophe reinsurance market where claims are resolved relatively quickly after a loss event. In addition, in both cases insurers refused to sell new policies in certain areas or lines and canceled existing policies in order to reduce exposure.
Although our analysis focuses mostly on the insurance industry, our model of risk overhang applies to other industries as well; the critical features are that past business decisions produce continuing exposure to risk, that these risks are difficult to hedge, and that they are correlated with risk from new transactions in the firm's line of business. Both lenders and certain securities firms share these features, and key features of both "credit crunches" and securities market crises are consistent with the predictions of the risk overhang model. Similar considerations should apply to nonfinancial firms: to the extent that they face noninsured exposures from past transactions in one of their major business lines, they will be reluctant to undertake additional business in this line -even if this additional business seems profitable in isolation. Notes: Premium growth is measured as the percent annual change in written premiums. In the case of Earthquake insurance there was no following crisis event, although reports indicate that the Northridge Earthquake in 1994 did prolong the market disruption in catastrophe reinsurance. The profit measure is equal to 100-overall operating ratio (as reported in Best's Aggregates and Averages). This is100-(acquisition expenses/written premiums) -((incurred losses+ loss adjustment expenses)/earned premiums)+ (investment income/earned premiums), where written premiums are revenues on a cash basis, earned premiums are revenues on an accrual basis, and incurred losses are an undiscounted estimate of expected loss. Allied lines covers windstorm, riot, explosion, fire sprinkler leakage and other perils. Source: A.M. Best's Aggregates and Averages, Property Casualty Edition.
